

PUBLIC INTEREST MONITOR

ANNUAL REPORT
2024 - 2025

31 October 2025

The Honourable Deb Frecklington MP
Attorney-General and Minister for Justice
Minister for Integrity
1 William Street
BRISBANE QLD 4000

Dear Attorney-General

I am pleased to submit for presentation to the Parliament the Annual Report 2024-25 for the Public Interest Monitor.

This report complies with the requirements of the *Crime and Corruption Act 2001*.

This report also fulfils the requirements of section 363(1) of the *Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000* with respect to the QPS.

In accordance with s 743(3C) of the *Police Powers and Responsibilities Act*, the parts of the report relating to official warnings for consorting and public safety orders are provided to you as the Minister responsible for administering the *Criminal Code* and the *Peace and Good Behaviour Act 1982* respectively.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'David Adsett', with a stylized flourish at the end.

David Adsett
Public Interest Monitor

31 October 2025

The Honourable Dan Purdie MP
Minister for Police and Emergency Services
1 William Street
BRISBANE QLD 4000

Dear Minister

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This report complies with the requirements of the *Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000*.

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Yours sincerely

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David Adsett
Public Interest Monitor

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List of abbreviations

Term	Notes
CCA	<i>Crime and Corruption Act 2001 (Qld)</i>
CCC	Crime and Corruption Commission
HRA	<i>Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld)</i>
OCGG	Organised Crime Gangs Group
OMCG	outlaw motorcycle gang
OWFC	official warning for consorting
PGBA	<i>Peace and Good Behaviour Act 1982 (Qld)</i>
PIM	Public Interest Monitor
PPRA	<i>Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld)</i>
PPR Regs	<i>Police Powers and Responsibilities Regulations 2012 (Qld)</i>
QCSA	<i>Queensland Community Safety Act 2024 (Qld)</i>
QPS	Queensland Police Service
SDW	Surveillance device warrant
TIA	<i>Telecommunications Interception Act 2009 (Qld)</i>
TPDA	<i>Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act 2005 (Qld)</i>

Public Interest Monitor's overview

2024-25 activities

In 2024-25 the Deputy PIMs and I continued to focus on ensuring that surveillance device warrants, covert search warrants and telephone interception warrants were issued in appropriate circumstances, that the public interest was considered in warrant applications and that, where issued, warrants were executed in accordance with their terms. We did this by:

- Scrutinising materials prepared by Queensland law enforcement agencies for use in warrant applications.
- Negotiating with law enforcement agency staff about addressing any identified deficiencies in materials to be used in warrant applications.
- Appearing before issuing officers in warrant applications and making submission about the public interest and aspects of the warrant application material including any evidentiary and other deficiencies.
- Reviewing post execution reports prepared by Queensland law enforcement agencies to ensure warrants were executed in accordance with their conditions and the applicable law.
- Inspecting Queensland Police Service warrant records to ensure compliance with legal requirements.

The object of our activities in 2024-25 continued to be directed to ensuring agencies with invasive surveillance powers used those powers in compliance with the law and with proper regard to the public interest.

Personnel changes

During 2024-25 Deputy PIM Gail Hartridge resigned after six years in the role. I thank Gail for her exemplary service and support.

In August 2025 Dr Peter McDermott RFD was appointed to the role of Deputy Public Interest Monitor for a term of three years.

I thank the Deputy PIMs for their diligence and support throughout 2024-25. I also thank the legal and administrative staff of the Queensland Police Service and the Crime and Corruption Commission for their cooperation with us.

David Adsett
Public Interest Monitor

About the Public Interest Monitor (PIM)

Purpose

The PIM and Deputy PIM roles assist to ensure that:

- the public interest is considered in applications for the exercise of intrusive surveillance and control;
- law enforcement agencies comply with the law in making applications to exercise these powers.

Vision

Queensland law enforcement agencies make applications for the exercise of intrusive powers according to law, and public interest issues are properly put before the entity determining the application.

Objectives

- Effective advocacy on behalf of the public interest in applications for the exercise of intrusive powers.
- Ensure Queensland law enforcement agencies comply with the laws regulating applications for the use of intrusive powers and retain appropriate records.
- The public is informed about the operation of the legislative schemes that permit the exercise of intrusive powers.

Performance indicators

- Application materials meet statutory requirements and any deficiencies identified have been advised to the agency and the issuer of the proposed warrant or order.
- When applications for warrants and other orders are made, evidence is scrutinized for sufficiency to ground the warrant or order and the public interest is addressed in any submissions to the decision maker.
- On identification of non-compliance during warrant execution, relevant judges, tribunal members ministers and CEOs are appropriately informed.
- QPS maintains adequate records and is advised of deficiencies in a timely manner.
- Statistics are gathered and an annual report presented.

Current office holders

David Adsett - PIM

David was admitted as a barrister in 1986. He has extensive experience as a federal prosecutor and practised in this capacity in Brisbane, Sydney and Perth. He occupied senior national roles at the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions including service as a Deputy Director. He has been in private practice since 2020. David was appointed as PIM in October 2020 and his current appointment expires in December 2025.

Gavin Rebetzke – DPIM

Gavin was admitted as a solicitor in 1995 and as a barrister in 2007. He has a broad practice which includes commercial, employment, professional disciplinary, defamation, migration and judicial review matters. He was appointed as a DPIM in June 2023 and his current appointment expires in June 2026.

Dr Peter McDermott RFD - DPIM

Peter was admitted as a barrister in 1978. He has extensive experience in administrative tribunals and served as a member of the former South Queensland Regional Community Corrections Board. His service on the Australian Army Reserve was recognised by the award of the Reserve Force Decoration. Peter was appointed as a DPIM in August 2025 and his current appointment expires in August 2028.

Reporting requirements

This is the 2024-25 annual report of the PIM as required by the *Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000* (Qld) (PPRA) and the *Crime and Corruption Act 2001* (Qld) (CCA).

Under the PPRA and the CCA, I must report on the following matters:

- surveillance device warrants and covert search warrants issued to the Queensland Police Service (QPS) and the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC);
- official warnings for consorting (OWFCs) issued by QPS officers;
- preventative detention orders issued under the *Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act 2005* Qld (TPDA);
- control orders issued under the *Criminal Code* (Cth) relating to Queensland residents or issued by Courts in Queensland; and
- public safety orders made by QPS commissioned officers under the *Peace and Good Behaviour Act 1982* (PGBA).

The report must not contain information that discloses or may lead to the disclosure of the identity of any person who has been, is being, or is to be, investigated or contain information that indicates a particular investigation has been, is being, or is to be conducted.

This report also fulfils the requirements of section 363(1) of the PPRA with respect to the QPS. That provision requires that I must report every six months on inspections I have carried out to examine the extent of compliance by the QPS with the record keeping requirements relating to surveillance device warrants.

Other PIM functions

In addition to the functions discussed above and that are the subject of this report, the PIM also has an extensive role in relation to the issue of telecommunication interception warrants. This role is performed under the *Telecommunications Interception Act 2009* (Qld) (TIA) and the *Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979* (Cth). The function involves review of application materials prepared by the QPS and CCC for the issue of telecommunications interception warrants.

After reviewing the warrant application material, the PIM appears on the application which is made before an eligible judge or nominated Administrative Review Tribunal member.

The PIM is also the inspecting entity for the QPS in relation to its record keeping obligations under the TIA. A separate report is prepared and submitted to the State and Commonwealth Attorneys-General in relation to this aspect of the PIM's functions.

Surveillance device warrants and covert search warrants

Section 743 of the PPRA provides that I must report on the use of covert search warrants under the PPRA. Section 328 of the CCA provides that I must report on the use of surveillance device warrants and covert search warrants for the previous year.

Table 1: Warrants and authorisations issued 2024-25

Agency	Warrant / authorisation type	No
QPS	covert search warrants	1
	surveillance device warrants	61
	extension and/or variation of surveillance device warrants	8
	retrieval warrants	7
	emergency authorisations	0
CCC	covert search warrants	0
	surveillance device warrants	8
	extension and/or variation of surveillance device warrants	0
	retrieval warrants	2
	emergency authorisations	0

Table 2: Types of surveillance devices authorised 2024-25

Agency	Device type	No
QPS	listening devices	14
	optical surveillance devices	7
	tracking devices	27
	combination devices	30
	data surveillance devices	0
CCC	listening devices	12
	optical surveillance devices	4
	tracking devices	5
	combination devices	12
	data surveillance devices	0

Warrant applications

The PIM made written submissions in all surveillance device warrant (SDW) and covert search warrant (CSW) applications brought by the QPS and the CCC. Those submissions addressed legislative compliance and issues relevant to the exercise of the judge's or magistrate's discretion.

In several cases, prior to the application, there was discussion between the PIM and the lawyer representing the QPS or CCC applicant about either the form of the warrant or the sufficiency of the material to be presented in the application hearing. On most occasions, the discussion resulted in satisfactory resolution of the issue, either by alteration of the form of the draft warrant including amendment of conditions or amendment of the application material. If an issue could not be resolved, it became the subject of submissions to the judge or magistrate during the application hearing and the issue was resolved by the judge or magistrate.

Two applications for SDWs were opposed outright. On one occasion, the warrant application was abandoned. The other application proceeded on a contested basis and the SDW was granted. All other applications were granted. On several occasions individual SDW conditions were opposed and modifications were incorporated in the final SDW.

Human Rights

When considering applications for a SDW or a CSW, a judge or magistrate acts in an administrative capacity and, in this capacity, is a public entity under the *Human Rights Act 2019* (Qld) (HRA).

The human right that is most significantly affected by the issue and execution of a SDW or a CSW is the right to privacy. Under the HRA, a person has the right not to have their privacy, family or home unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with. The PPRA and CCA provide important safeguards of this right. The Acts provide that, when considering a SDW application, a judge or magistrate must be mindful of the highly intrusive nature of a surveillance device warrant and must, amongst other things, have regard to the extent to which the privacy of any person is likely to be affected by the warrant.

In considering an application for a CSW, a judge must, similarly, be mindful of the highly intrusive nature of such a warrant. Where, after taking all the relevant considerations into account, a judge or magistrate decides to issue a warrant, the warrant will authorise activities that will interfere with individuals' privacy and, in some cases, that of their family and home.

During the reporting period, the PIM and Deputy PIMs routinely considered the compatibility of applications made by law enforcement entities with the HRA. At the warrant application hearings, the PIM and Deputy PIMs brought relevant HRA considerations to the attention of the judge or magistrate in their submissions.

Extra judicial tracking devices

Chapter 13 of the PPRA provides that a senior officer of the QPS at or above the rank of inspector may authorise the use of a tracking device for no longer than 48 hours where it is assessed that taking a person into custody involves a serious risk to safety. The authorisation may only be given in circumstances where the use of the tracking device will help minimize the risk associated with taking the person into custody.

Table 3: Extra judicial tracking device authorisations issued 2024-25

Agency	Type	No
QPS	tracking device authorisations issued	0
	extensions to tracking device authorisations	0

Records must be kept of the grounds for giving the authorisation and the date and time of commencement of the authorisation. Satisfactory records were kept in respect of all the authorisations given in 2024-25.

SDW outcomes

Breaches of warrant conditions

On five occasions during the year SDW conditions were breached.

In the case of the QPS, three breaches of warrant conditions were reported:

- **Breach 1**
SDWs contain a condition that only authorised officers are permitted to assist in executing the warrant. On one occasion an officer who was not authorised to assist in the executing a SDW monitored the surveillance device. Once this was noted and during execution of the warrant, the officer's name was added to the authorised officer list.
- **Breach 2**
A SDW authorised the monitoring of surveillance devices installed in premises only when a particular named person was present at the premises. The monitoring devices were mistakenly activated on 3 occasions during the currency of the warrant when the person was not present. The mistaken activation lasted for less than 20 minutes in total and no activity was monitored. The breaches were investigated when they occurred and the reasons for the breaches identified and satisfactorily remedied.
- **Breach 3**
A SDW authorised the monitoring of listening surveillance devices installed in premises. One conversation was monitored in breach of the warrant. When identified, the breach was satisfactorily remedied, including through training and a change in internal processes.

In the case of the CCC, two breaches were reported.

- **Breach 1**
On one occasion a CCC staff member who was not included in the authorised person list accessed surveillance material they were not authorised to access. On another occasion, in relation to the same warrant, two CCC staff members were provided access to surveillance material and were not included in the authorised person list. One of these CCC staff members accessed material they were not authorised to access. The warrant holder was immediately informed. The absence of authorisations was identified as an oversight. Remedial action was taken, including rectifying the authorisation list and counselling the relevant CCC staff. All relevant CCC staff were further briefed on their responsibilities relating to holding appropriate authorisation before accessing warrant materials.
- **Breach 2:**
A check was conducted by a CCC staff member to confirm a device was deactivated on the day after a SDW expired. It was identified that the device had recorded for 3 minutes and 37 seconds after the SDW had expired. It was confirmed that the device was deactivated and the warrant holder was immediately informed. The activation of the device after the SDW had expired was confirmed as an oversight. Remedial action was taken, including identifying the CCC staff who had accessed the recording and removing the recording from CCC records. The recording was not accessed by CCC investigators. All relevant CCC staff were briefed on responsibilities relating to the use of surveillance devices under the terms of the warrant.

Post execution reports

On the expiration of a SDW, the QPS or CCC officer must supply a report to me or a Deputy PIM in the form of an affidavit. The report must contain details of the execution of the warrant, the benefit to the investigation and details of the use of the evidence or information obtained.

In several matters the PIM and Deputy PIMs required supplementary affidavits or further information in addition to the compliance affidavit originally provided so that compliance issues which came to light during review, were adequately addressed. These requests from the PIM and Deputy PIMs were complied with by the relevant agency.

Warrant benefits

For warrants issued in the reporting period, in over 60% of cases, the use of the devices was reported to have been beneficial to the investigation. In some cases, the devices were not installed. In some other cases the devices were installed and operated but failed to provide information or evidence that was of benefit to the investigation.

Interference with third party property rights

During the reporting period there were seven occasions where the installation or retrieval of a surveillance device involved access to an adjoining property. On all seven occasions the interference with property rights was permissible under both the terms of the warrant and the applicable legislation.

Surveillance device warrant records and inspections

Record destruction project

The PPRA provides that a record or a report obtained by using a surveillance device must be destroyed if no longer required. During 2024-25 QPS continued to identify surveillance device records and reports that were not required for a purpose mentioned in the PPRA. The records and reports were destroyed as required under the PPRA.

Six monthly report on QPS inspections

Under chapter 13 of the PPRA, I am the inspecting entity for the QPS in relation to SDW records. As inspecting entity, I must, from time to time, inspect the records of the QPS relating to SDWs to decide the extent of compliance with chapter 13 by the QPS. At six monthly intervals I must report to the Minister for Police on the results of those inspections. In the six months ended 30 June 2025, I conducted inspections of QPS records. As a result of those inspections, I report that the QPS and law enforcement officers of the QPS have complied with chapter 13 record keeping requirements.

Official warnings for consorting

The PPRA provides that a QPS officer may give a person an official warning for consorting (OWFC). An OWFC is a written notice that warns a person not to consort (associate) with a named recognised offender. A recognised offender is anyone who has been convicted of a 'relevant offence'. A relevant offence is defined as an offence that is punishable by more than five years' imprisonment. If the person who receives the notice consorts with (i.e. associates with) any of the people named on the OWFC on two occasions or more, they are liable to be charged with the offence of habitually consorting which carries a maximum penalty of three years imprisonment.

In addition to being able to issue OWFCs, the QPS has been given extensive ancillary powers in relation to the issue of OWFCs. These include ancillary powers allowing an officer who reasonably suspects consorting to have occurred to search a person, stop and search a vehicle or require a person's name, address, date of birth or identifying particulars.

An OWFC may be given orally or in writing. If given orally, a written warning must be provided within 72 hours. The written warning must be in an approved form. The PPRA provides that, before giving the warning, a police officer 'must consider whether it is appropriate having regard to the objective of disrupting and preventing criminal activity by deterring recognised offenders from establishing, maintaining or expanding a criminal network.'

Reporting requirements

I am required under section 743 of the PPRA to provide a report in respect of OWFCs during the year ended 30 June 2025. The report is to include the following matters:


- the number of OWFCs given during the year;
- the number of times the giving of an OWFC led to a person committing an offence against:
 - section 790 PPRA (assault or obstruct police officer); or
 - section 791 PPRA (contravene direction or requirement of police officer);
- the extent of compliance by the QPS with chapter 2, part 6A of the PPRA; and
- the use of OWFCs generally.

Sub-section 743(3C) of the PPRA requires that this part of the annual report must be given to the Attorney-General as the Minister administering the *Criminal Code* (Qld).

Table 4: OWFC reporting requirements 2024-2025

Reporting requirement	No
official warnings for consorting given	87
times the giving of an official warning for consorting led to a person committing an offence against section 790 of the PPRA (assault or obstruct police officer)	0
times the giving of an official warning for consorting led to a person committing an offence against section 791 of the PPRA (contravene direction or requirement of police officer)	0

The QPS divide OWFCs into two types – pre-emptive warnings and retrospective warnings. Pre-emptive warnings are issued before an individual associates with the named recognised offenders with the object of preventing future consorting behaviour. Sometimes these are served on prisoners prior to release to prevent them from associating with recognised offenders after release. Retrospective warnings are issued when officers encounter individuals associating with recognised offenders and decide to issue an OWFC to disrupt that consorting activity and to prevent future consorting activity. When a retrospective OWFC notice is issued, the officer can also direct the individual served with the notice to leave a place and not return for up to 24 hours, to prevent the continuation of the consorting behaviour. The requirements for compliance with both a pre-emptive and a retrospective notice are the same - the person served with the OWFC notice must not consort with the recognised offenders identified in the notice.

Figure 1: Number of OWFC types – 2024-25 and previous four years

In 2024-25 less OWFCs were issued than in the immediate prior year.

Compliance with chapter 2 part 6A

The PPRA and the *Police Powers and Responsibilities Regulations 2012* (Qld) (PPR Regs) provide that:

- if practicable, the giving of an OWFC must be electronically recorded;
- the giving of an OWFC is an 'enforcement act';
- specific details about each OWFC must be included in the QPS Register of Enforcement Acts; and
- a copy of the OWFC notice must be kept.

Record keeping

I inspected QPS records including the QPS business management system QPrime, the Register of Enforcement Acts and relevant QPS data to check compliance. Many instances were found where the data required to be kept by the PPR Regs such as the details of service were not accurately recorded. Enquiries into the cause showed the data entry screen in QPrime is poorly designed and data is regularly not entered because of these screen design faults. For example, essential data entry requirements are not visible on the relevant data entry form. This has led to data loss and information gaps. Double handling occurs while data is rechecked and data cleansing processes conducted. It is strongly recommended that the relevant QPrime data entry screen is redesigned to facilitate more accurate data entry.

The following record keeping matters were noted:

- Details of service
Regularly not accurately recorded.
- Video recording of delivery
Where recorded these records were mostly accessible. Process checks confirmed recordings of delivery of the OWFC notice were available in most cases.
- Note of reasons
These records varied. On some occasions extensive statements of reasons were compiled, on others the records were minimal. To some extent this was a product of the circumstances in which the OWFC was issued. If it was a pre-emptive warning, there was more opportunity to create a record of reasons. Records for retrospective warnings were frequently not recorded or, if recorded, were of a rudimentary nature.
- Recognised offender status
On one occasion police had served an OWFC nominating several recognised offenders the person recipient of OWFC must not associate with. One of the people nominated as a recognised offender was found not to have that status. The recipient of the notice was advised on the error. The OWFC continued to operate as the other person nominated had recognised offender status.
- Mislabelling
On some occasions interactions were mistakenly labelled as relating to the issue of an OWFC

when they involved another police interaction. These instances have been corrected in the records.

Other issues

- Service of OWFC notices

During much of 2024-25 there was uncertainty about whether electronic service of OWFCs would continue to be permissible in its current form. Currently, OWFCs can be served by:

- delivering the OWFC form to the person personally in hard copy format;
- sending the OWFC to the person by post or certified mail; or
- sending the form to the person by electronic communication to the unique electronic address nominated by the person.

Service by electronic communication is a frequently used method of service. The new electronic service provisions in the *Queensland Community Safety Act 2024 (Qld)* (QCSA) extend to OWFCs and change the requirements for electronic service of OWFC by introducing a more prescriptive method of electronic service. These new electronic service provisions are yet to commence in relation to OWFCs. The new service provisions require a form of consent which may be less likely to be given by the intended recipient of an OWFC, rendering electronic service practically difficult. QPS identified this issue during planning for the operationalisation of the new provisions. For much of 2024-25, there was uncertainty about whether the new provisions would come into operation with respect to OWFCs or whether a regulation would be made to postpone commencement with respect to OWFCs. In late August 2025, a regulation was made postponing the commencement of the QCSA electronic service provision in relation to OWFCs.¹ This means that the existing electronic service provisions will continue to apply, enabling the continuation of electronic service of OWFCs in its current form by police officers in the community. The uncertainty relating to the commencement of the QCSA electronic service provisions and their applicability to OWFCs impacted on upgrades of police QLite devices and on the development and issue of OWFC training materials. These processes can now proceed.

- Training

The issue of OWFCs is administered within QPS by the Organised Crime Gangs Group (OCGG). QPS operating procedures provide that the issuing of OWFCs is to be implemented and managed at the police district level. This model of devolved responsibility recognises the different priorities and policing environments in each QPS police district. The effectiveness of this model depends, in part, on the capability of officers in each police district to implement the OWFC laws and procedures in a legally compliant manner. QPS noted that OCGG continued to deliver training seminars at district level in 2024-25 to enhance district officer capability.

- Recognised offender status records

During some parts of the year the data relating to recognised offenders was not available to officers. This was caused by the relevant recognised offenders flags attaching to individuals recorded in the QPrime system being temporarily unavailable, thereby preventing the identification of potential recognised offenders to support issue of OWFCs. Once this

¹ *Queensland Community Safety (Postponement) Regulation (No 2) 2025*

discrepancy was identified it was remedied. QPS confirmed that this data discrepancy did not lead to any OWFCs being mistakenly issued, however it may have meant fewer OWFCs were issued because persons were not being shown in the QPrime system as recognised offenders. Recognised offender status records need to be more carefully managed to ensure that accurate records are available to officers considering the issue of OWFCs.

Use generally

OWFC are a means to disrupt the formation of organised criminal networks. One way of assessing the effectiveness of the notices is anecdotal evidence. One QPS officer stationed in a regional community reported that OWFCs had been very effective in halting the formation of a small crime syndicate engaging in escalating levels of criminal activity. The six members were each served with a OWFC and, without regular social contact and interaction, the group dissipated and the associated offending ceased.

In responding to a recent media enquiry about the effectiveness of OWFCs, a QPS spokesperson said:

The impact of the [OWFC] legislation has been significant, through the targeted consorting warning notices operations. The impact of these is not necessarily seen in charges, convictions or the sentencing of individuals. The benefits for the Queensland community are demonstrated in the networks being dismantled through the warnings and operations and their inability to meet. This is supported by considerable intelligence indicating the consorting regime is impacting these networks.

The successes are seen in the impact on criminal syndicates', in particular outlaw motorcycle gangs' (OMCGs) inability to meet, make contact and associate. We have used the legislation to disrupt OMCG events, rides and meetings. The warning notices have been used to target other adult gang syndicates and the powers to stop, detain and search by police for those suspected of consorting. The use of the consorting legislation has delivered a safer environment in the restaurants and clubs where OMCG members started to gather.

The use of OWFCs in police action against OMCGs in Cairns and the Gold Coast featured in media reports in 2024-25.

I undertook a review of OWFC statistics for 2024-25. I specifically reviewed the demographic data collected when OWFCs were issued.

My review of the data, including a comparison to the previous year's statistics, did not reveal any apparent disproportionate focus on any portion of the community.

Effectiveness

Consistently with the QPS comments noted above, the QPS regards the ability to issue OWFC as a key tool in disrupting criminal networks across a variety of crime types.

The data and records reviewed showed OWFCs were being utilised by QPS. The data entry interface is not user friendly and needs to be redesigned and simplified to support the capability. Some anecdotal evidence is available to show OWFCs have a disruptive effect. Similarly, a review of the data shows that OWFCs are issued across the State, in different policing environments and in relation to different forms of criminal activity. The continued use of the capability in relation to outlaw motor cycle gangs, suggest it is regarded as a useful tactic to disrupt OMCG operations.

Preventative detention orders

Preventative detention orders are made under the *Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act 2005* (Qld) (TPDA). The stated purpose of the TPDA is to:

allow a person to be taken into custody and detained for a short period of time in order to—

- (a) prevent a terrorist act that is capable of being carried out, and could occur, in the near future from occurring; or*
- (b) preserve evidence of, or relating to, a recent terrorist act.*

The TPDA provides that senior QPS officers may apply to an issuing authority (a judge or retired judge appointed for this purpose by the Minister) for a preventative detention order or a prohibited contact order where the prescribed criteria are met. The PIM has a role in applications for such orders.

Reporting requirements

Under section 743 of the PPRA I am required to provide a report in respect of orders under the TPDA during the year ended 30 June 2025. The report is to include the following matters:

- the number of initial or final orders made during the year;
- whether a person was taken into custody under each of those orders and, if so, how long the person was detained for;
- particulars of any complaints about the detention of a person under a preventative detention order made or referred during the year to the ombudsman or the CCC;
- the number of prohibited contact orders made during the year; and
- the use of preventative detention orders and prohibited contact orders generally.

Table 5: Preventative detention orders 2024-25

Reporting requirement	No
initial or final orders made	0
persons taken into custody under initial or final orders	0
prohibited contact orders made	0

Control orders

Division 104 of the *Criminal Code* (Cth) establishes procedures for control orders to be issued. A control order allows obligations, prohibitions and restrictions to be imposed on a person for one or more of the following purposes:

- (a) *protecting the public from a terrorist act;*
- (b) *preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act;*
- (c) *preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country.*

A senior member of the Australian Federal Police, with the relevant federal minister's consent, may apply to an issuing court (the Federal Court of Australia or the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia) for the issue of an interim control order. If the interim control order is made, subsequent applications may be made to the issuing court to vary, confirm or revoke the order. Where the person in relation to whom an order is sought is a resident of Queensland or the issuing court that is requested to make the order is in Queensland, the PIM has a role in the application.

Reporting requirements

I am required under section 743 of the PPRA to provide a report in respect of control orders under the *Criminal Code* (Cth) involving the PIM during the year ended 30 June 2024. The report is to include the following matters:

- the number of control orders confirmed, declared void, revoked or varied during the year; and
- the use of control orders generally.

Table 6: Control orders under *Criminal Code* (Cth) 2024-25

Reporting requirement	No
Control orders involving Qld PIM confirmed, declared void, revoked or varied	0

Public safety orders

The main object of the *Peace and Good Behaviour Act 1982* (Qld) (PGBA) is:

to protect the safety, welfare, security, and peace and good order of the community from risks presented by people engaging in antisocial, disorderly or criminal conduct.

Under the PGBA, commissioned QPS officers may issue a public safety order of up to seven days duration in relation to a person or group of persons where the commissioned officer is satisfied certain conditions are met. The stated object of a public safety order issued in this way is to prevent a person, or group of persons, from doing specific things such as entering an area or attending premises or an event.

Reporting requirements

I am required under section 743 of the PPRA to provide a report in respect of public safety orders made by commissioned officers under the PGBA during the year ended 30 June 2025. The report is to include the following matters:

- the number of public safety orders made by commissioned officers during the year;
- the extent of compliance by the QPS with the PGBA, part 3, division 2; and
- the use of public safety orders generally.

Table 7: Public safety orders 2024-25

Reporting requirement	No
Number of public safety orders made by commissioned officers	1

The single order issued in 2024-25 was issued in accordance with the requirements in the PGBA. In particular, the issuing officer had regard to the relevant factors when considering whether to make the order. QPS reported that the order was effective in reducing risk in relation to a proposed unauthorised public assembly.

Sub-section 743(3C) of the PPRA requires that this part of my annual report must be given to the Attorney-General as the Minister administering the PGBA.